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Abstract 
 
Analysis of the recent financial crisis has tended to focus upon ‘market’ and corresponding 
‘regulatory’ failures. While this provides important insights, it may neglect deeper issues at 
the root of recent problems. In this paper we take a broader perspective, drawing upon the 
strategic choice approach to the theory of firm (Cowling and Sugden, 1998, 1999). We 
present a governance-based analysis which emphasises the process of engaging interested 
‘publics’ in corporate decision-making processes. We illustrate our arguments with respect 
to three UK cases – Northern Rock, Bradford and Bingley, and HBOS banks – which each 
required major interventions by the UK Government and whose recent history reveals 
significant changes in ownership, governance and corporate strategy. We argue that the 
current period of reform for these former building societies represents an ideal opportunity 
to address serious concerns over governance within the financial sector and we propose a 
revised mutual solution as one appropriate way forward.   
 
Keywords: Regulation, governance, strategic decision making, strategic failure, ownership, 
mutuality, financial sector.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis of 2007/2008 and the subsequent economic crisis have raised 
serious questions around the existing financial architecture. The banking sector plays a 
critical role in all economies, affecting the activities of every individual and firm. Yet as 
noted by Vives (2010) it is also a unique sector because banks display a particular mix of 
features that together imply enormous potential for systemic impacts. Indeed, this has been 
starkly demonstrated by the quickly-spreading contagion initiated by the so-called 
‘subprime’ housing crisis in the USA. Banking groups around the globe have suffered from 
the collapse of deals, bank runs, crippling bad debts, emergency financial injections and 
bankruptcies, with some banks being taken into public ownership.  
 
Much has been written about the subprime crisis in the USA, how this rapidly expanded into 
the worldwide financial and economic crisis that is evident today, and the various 
government responses to these challenges (for an extensive overview of events, see 
Brunnermeier, 2009). Most contributions have attributed blame to poor internal monitoring, 
excessive risk-taking within financial markets and, above all, inadequate regulation to 
counter the range of market failures intrinsic to the sector (see, for example, Blundell-
Wignall et al., 2008, Krugman, 2008, Brunnermeier, 2009, HM Treasury, 2009, Beck et al., 
2010, Vives, 2010, and Rajan, 2010). As such, analysis typically adopts a market failure 
perspective, with policy recommendations centred on finding appropriate regulatory 
responses. While these analyses have provided important insights, few have paid significant 
attention to underlying issues of governance of the banking system. Moreover, where they 
have emphasised governance issues (for example in the Walker Review, 2009), there has 
been a relatively narrow focus on specific failures in corporate governance.    
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the issues from an alternative theoretical starting point 
that emphasises the centrality of democratic governance in all socio-economic activity, and 
leads to a distinctive policy view on the banking sector. Specifically, we adopt a strategic 
choice approach to the theory of the firm. This is rooted in the work of Cowling and Sugden 
(1998, 1999), who build on seminal contributions from Coase (1937) and Zeitlin (1974). The 
strategic choice approach highlights the democratic governance of key decisions within 
firms (and other institutions) as critical for achieving the public interest, and views a given 
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sector in terms of its impacts throughout the economy. Examining the financial crisis from 
this perspective allows us to identify deeper causes behind recent events, providing insights 
into appropriate policy responses.  
 
The analysis makes use of three cases which required major interventions by the UK 
Government: Northern Rock; Bradford and Bingley; and HBOS. These are all significant 
financial institutions that have required substantial government assistance, leading to (part) 
public ownership. Moreover they are all former building societies that were mutually owned 
until a change in government policy in the mid 1980s allowed their conversion into 
publically-owned banks.
1
 An analysis of these cases using the strategic choice approach 
therefore links their plight in the present financial crisis with previous decisions concerning 
their ownership and governance. This leads to a re-examination of the issue of mutual 
ownership and its potential as an alternative to the shareholder or public ownership models 
that currently dominate, alongside a series of other suggestions relating to improving 
governance mechanisms. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section (2) considers conventional market failure and 
regulatory perspectives on the financial crisis. In Section (3) we introduce the strategic 
choice approach as an alternative foundation for analysis. Section (4) uses our chosen cases 
to argue that changes in ownership and governance provide crucial insights into the roots of 
current problems. Section (5) then explores possibilities for reforming the governance of the 
sector by considering an updated mutual-based solution. Finally, Section (6) concludes.  
 
2. Conventional Analyses of the Financial Crisis: Market and Regulatory Failure 
 
Most analysis of the financial crisis has focused on market failures that characterise the 
financial sector and corresponding regulatory shortcomings that have failed to address or 
exacerbated these failures. The financial sector is characterised by what Vives (2010, p.1) 
describes as the “full array of classical market failures”. These include: externalities in the 
form of co-ordination problems and contagion, given the inter-connectedness of the system 
as a whole; asymmetric information among agents, leading to agency problems, moral 
hazard and adverse selection, and often manifested in excessive risk-taking behaviour; and 
the potential existence of market power. The complex co-existence of this set of issues has 
posed significant challenges for competition policy and regulation. Beck et al. (2010, p.1), 
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for example, describe a broad evolution from “the discontinuation of most standard 
competition policies in banking in order to foster financial stability” following the Great 
Depression, to “a swing of the pendulum towards deregulation, with more competition and 
innovation but also with many banking crises” from the 1970s. This latter period 
corresponds with fundamental changes in the functioning of banks, which forms the basis for 
much existing analysis of the causes of the most recent financial crisis.   
 
In the ‘traditional’ banking model, funding for mortgage advances is predominantly from 
retail deposits. Banks make loans after undertaking risk assessment of clients and there is 
ongoing monitoring of borrowers, providing countenance against adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Loans are held as assets on balance sheets and banks cover themselves against 
unexpected risk by holding ‘appropriate’ levels of capital, while loan insurance is provided 
internally through the risk premia priced into the interest rate. In essence the performance of 
banks is determined by the quality of their own lending decisions, and responsibility lies 
therein (Michie and Llewellyn, 2010). Since the mid-to late 1990s, however, banks have 
begun to finance large parts of their lending through a combination of inter-bank borrowing 
on global wholesale markets and securitisation (re-packaging of assets to be sold on to 
investors as securities). This changed the landscape considerably. In benign conditions the 
inter-bank market allows banks to renew their maturing borrowings quite easily to meet 
daily obligations. Yet short-term liquidity can become a severe problem if market confidence 
is adversely affected. Moreover securitisation is a significant break from traditional banking, 
where the selling of loan assets was effectively precluded due to asymmetric information and 
the associated classic ‘lemons problem’ (Akerlof, 1970). Under securitisation the ‘lemons 
problem’ is supposedly nullified by the pooling of a diverse set of loan assets through 
Special Purpose Vehicles, thus making them attractive to investors. The debt products 
associated with these Special Purpose Vehicles were structured so that each could issue a 
variety of debt with different levels of agency rated risk attached, and these risks were seen 
to be minimal since insurance on default was being provided via the purchase of Credit 
Default Swaps.  From a public interest perspective, however, potential problems arise since 
the securitisation process ultimately lessens the banking sector’s collective interest in and 
ability to monitor loans and appropriately evaluate their risk (Chick, 2008).  
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A common interpretation of events is that the adoption of these new modes of finance have 
allowed banks to pursue aggressive strategies in lucrative mortgage markets, offering a range 
of low-cost products, including to customers who might be deemed to be risky (Langley, 
2008). A corresponding lack of prudence in lending decisions, poor monitoring of loans 
amidst the complexity of Special Purpose Vehicles (asymmetric information) and 
inappropriate risk identification have been widely acknowledged as the market failures at the 
root of the recent financial crisis. Further market failures of co-ordination and contagion 
(externalities) ultimately destroyed confidence in the system as a whole, and began a rapid 
process of spill-over into the real economy.  
 
Given its raison de être as a response to these market failures, the effectiveness of regulation 
in balancing stability and competition is typically put under the spotlight in analysis of what 
went wrong and in making recommendations for what should change (see, for example, 
Blundell-Wignall et al., 2008; Beck et al, 2010; Vives, 2010). Contemporary global 
regulation emanates from the so-called Basel committee for international banking 
supervision, which among other things sets minimum capital requirements. However 
Krugman (2008) refers to the emergence of a ‘shadow banking system’ (p.158), which 
enabled the controls of the banking system to be avoided, initially facilitating increased 
profits, but without the stability and safety net that banking regulations are designed to 
provide. Thus blame is attributed to the advent of unregulated financial products such as 
auction-rate securities, Collateralised Debt Obligations and other similar modern financial 
instruments (see also Brunnermeier, 2009). Other criticism focuses on the mechanisms by 
which risk is measured within existing regulatory frameworks. There have been concerns 
raised about both the difficulty of statistically modelling risk due to lack of appropriate data, 
and the heavy reliance on unregulated credit-rating agencies (Danielsson et al., 2001; 
Langley, 2008). 
 
Such perspectives highlighting underlying market failures and corresponding regulatory 
shortcomings have been widely discussed and have influenced public policy reforms (see for 
example: proposals for the UK as outlined in HM Treasury, 2009; Independent Commission 
on Banking, 2011; and the establishment of a new Basel III Accord in 2010). They tend to 
focus on tightening existing financial regulations and improving monitoring to ensure more 
optimal handling of emerging problems. However, a relatively narrow ‘market failure’ frame 
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of analysis can mask more fundamental issues. In particular, what is often missed is the 
underlying processes of governance of the institutions that comprise the banking system and 
indeed contemporary capitalist economies more generally. In the next Section we therefore 
propose an alternative starting point for a complementary analysis. 
 
3. An Alternative Perspective: Strategic Choice and Governance  
 
The development of industries and economies can be analysed from a ‘strategic choice’ 
perspective (Bailey et al., 2006 and references therein) with roots in Cowling and Sugden’s 
(1987, 1994, 1998, 1999) analysis of the modern corporation and their relationships with 
national and local economies. Cowling and Sugden build upon Coase’s (1937) distinction 
between in-firm planning and outside-firm market co-ordination and Zeitlin’s (1974) 
observations on corporate governance, to define the modern corporation as ‘the means of co-
ordinating production from one centre of strategic decision-making’. Strategic decisions are 
defined as those which affect the strategic direction of the firm, such as the level of 
investment, employment or its location, and therefore its relationship with society (Cowling 
and Sugden, 1998, p.64-67). The concentration of strategic decision-making in large modern 
corporations, however, is likely to result in varying degrees of ‘strategic failure’: a situation 
where the outcomes of strategic decisions made by corporate hierarchies conflict, to a greater 
or lesser extent, with wider public interests. This is more likely in imperfect markets, where 
a ‘few’ corporate executives are often able to pursue private interests despite potential 
resistance from the ‘many’ stakeholders in society who may be affected by their decisions. 
Hence socially inefficient outcomes result, as those able to exert control can ignore wider 
public interests. 
 
We can make a simple application of the strategic choice framework to re-consider the 
recent takeover of HBOS by Lloyds TSB. Lloyds TSB Plc was a British bank that had 
avoided much of the contagion in the marketplace and was relatively well placed during the 
financial crisis. When, in autumn 2008, HBOS found itself in difficulties, Lloyds TSB 
sought a controversial take-over to form the Lloyds Banking Group. The deal went through 
in January 2009, but required the UK government to bypass normal competition rules, given 
the size of both banks. The takeover has been controversial, largely because the full 
implications for the public interest will take several years to emerge (see The Economist 
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6/11/08; Whittam-Smith, 10/11/08; The Daily Telegraph, 18/5/09). However the executives 
in control of the two banks were able to execute the deal with expediency, despite resistance 
from many of those with an interest (shareholders, employees, governments, consumer 
organisations, and indeed rival banks). While too early to make a judgement of strategic 
failure in this case, such a scenario carries a high risk of generating socially inefficient 
outcomes because for the most part those in opposition to the deal were excluded from the 
decision-making process, and therefore had no real voice in determining strategy.  
 
The main implication of the strategic choice approach is that through widening participation 
in strategic decision-making processes the power of ‘the few’ is diluted. They become part 
of ‘the many’ though the democratisation of governance, which in turn can nullify the risk of 
strategic failure and promote more socially optimal outcomes. In essence, this process gives 
Hirschmanian (1970) ‘voice’ (the articulation of interests to improve a situation) to those 
who are currently excluded, enabling a balance between the use of voice and the alternate 
mechanism of ‘exit’ (the withdrawal from an unsatisfactory situation). Overall, this implies 
greater focus upon how firms and other organisations are governed (see Branston et al, 2006, 
and Bailey et al., 2006). 
 
This perspective differs from the identification of specific market failures that lies behind 
much analysis of ownership, competition and regulation. In particular, the notion of 
governance is strongly process-oriented, dynamic and systemic. It implies a deep and broad 
understanding of corporate decision-making processes, starting from an analysis of whose 
interests are and should be articulated, and ultimately aiming to uncover ways of developing 
efficient and effective voice processes among the ‘publics’ affected by corporate decisions. 
Moreover, by recognising the separation of ownership and control as identified by Berle and 
Means (1932), the issue of ‘who’ owns the firm is not the main focus. In reality senior 
managers and the Boards of Directors of modern corporations exercise a good measure of 
control, yet often have no (or at least relatively small) direct ownership claims, whilst many 
(small) shareholders theoretically enjoy considerable ownership rights but have little real 
control. Ownership per se is not therefore the issue; it is important only in so far as different 
ownership settings in different contexts may render more or less likely the participation of 
those with an interest (‘publics’) in a firm’s decision-making processes. Indeed, this point 
seems to have been recognised by the recently established UK Commission on Ownership.
2
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A consequence of this perspective is a policy emphasis quite different to that typically placed 
on regulation. As identified by Branston et al. (2006a), regulation is essentially ‘an arms-
length response to failures in arms-length relationships’ (p.203); a rigid framework is 
employed to enforce behaviour deduced to be in the public interest. As such regulation often 
struggles to keep pace with the evolution of the sector (as has been suggested of recent 
developments in the financial sector). More importantly, the ‘public’ itself is usually 
divorced from the process, and there is every chance that alternatives to either the regulated 
outcome or the regulation mechanism might be desired. Gauging public interest through 
conjecture and attempting to achieve it through rigid regulation is a poor substitute for direct 
involvement of stakeholders in identifying and implementing optimal outcomes as an 
integral part of the decision-making process. Indeed, Long (1990, p. 171) defines the public 
interest in just such a way: “consequences of private parties’ actions create a public as that 
public discovers its shared concern with their effects and the need for their control. The 
public’s shared concern with consequences is a public interest”.3 Preferences are 
undoubtedly shaped by the process of involvement, so in the absence of a collective voice 
process we have no way of knowing with any certainty the public’s evolving interest in key 
decisions.  
 
As a simple analogy of the difference between a regulatory solution and the direct 
involvement of interested parties in decision-making, consider the actions of parents looking 
after a baby that is unhappy. When the baby can’t communicate, the parents have to guess at 
the cause of unhappiness, and it often takes time to identify the needs/desires of the child or 
to pacify it when these can’t be identified. This is akin to a regulated solution in that the 
benign ‘regulatory authority’ (the parents) are doing what they think is in the general interest 
of the child (the ‘public’). In contrast, when the baby is able to communicate the parents can 
find out exactly what the baby is unhappy about and address it directly, often after 
negotiations where the opinions of baby and parents may differ. This is almost certainly a 
more efficient solution in that it is quicker, because the parents don’t have to go through 
several guesses before hitting upon a resolution, and will most likely generate a Pareto 
improvement in that all involved are likely to be happier with both the outcome and 
mechanism of getting there. While this illustration considers mediating the interests of just 
one person rather than the many that form a public, the essential argument regarding 
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communication can be extended with appropriate collective mechanisms. With respect to 
regulation of the finance sector, a system based upon the articulation of the ‘voice’ of 
interested participants is likely to generate superior solutions to one which relies upon a 
fixed set of rules selected to achieve outcomes that are (often artificially) construed to be in 
the public interest.
4
 Indeed, this opens an interesting bridge with a resurgent stream of 
literature in political science that stresses the benefits of deliberative forms of democracy 
(and associated mechanisms) in the determination of societal objectives (Elster, 1998; 
Bohman, 1998; Dryzek, 2002).  
 
In contrast to analysing ‘static’ financial regulation and its failures, therefore, an alternative 
is to make a more fundamental examination of the dynamics of banking governance and its 
implications. Governance issues have indeed been raised in the context of the recent crisis, 
but typically with a narrow focus upon failures in corporate governance, and particularly on 
the extent to which the banks’ corporate boards and senior managers were allowed to engage 
in excessive risk-taking strategies. The most notable contribution in this regard is the Walker 
Review (2009) into the corporate governance of UK banks and financial enterprises, which 
notes that ‘better financial regulation cannot alone satisfactorily assure performance of the 
major banks…these entities need to be better governed’ (ibid, p.9). The Review goes on to 
make a series of recommendations for improving governance structures. Proposals are 
primarily related to the composition of the boards of directors (and the role of chairpersons), 
and to encouraging greater activism on the part of non-executive directors and institutional 
shareholders in monitoring and engaging with corporate strategy. On the latter point 
arguments are made for adequate training to ensure effective participation.
5
 
 
Many of the Walker review’s recommendations are sensible, important steps in creating a 
governance environment within banks that is more transparent, accountable and with internal 
checks and balances. Indeed, the need for better qualified (and trained) executives seems 
particularly important given the frequent charge that senior executives have struggled to 
understand the complexity of new financial products and were thus unable to monitor the 
activities of junior colleagues. However, it is debatable whether such recommendations 
alone would have been sufficient to nullify the risky strategies adopted by the banks amidst 
the rising property markets and neo-liberal beliefs in efficient markets and rational 
expectations that pre-dominated in the years leading up to the recent crisis. Indeed it is 
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notable that in such a climate, institutions such as rating agencies, central banks, 
governments and others failed to question the strategies and business operations of banks 
(Llewellyn, 2010). Moreover, even the governor of the Bank of England has questioned the 
efficacy of reformed international banking regulations, suggesting that “Basel III on its own 
will not prevent another crisis” (King, 2010, p.12). 
 
The strategic choice approach invites a deeper consideration of the processes of decision-
making that characterise the sector in seeking to understand the causes of the crisis. It urges 
analysis of how different (public and private) interests in the behaviour of banking 
institutions are articulated in the process of making key decisions. Focusing on issues such 
as which groups contribute to decision-making processes and whose interests are pursued in 
the execution of decisions, a process-oriented frame of analysis has potential to generate 
novel insights. In the next Section we illustrate our arguments with a discussion of three 
specific cases in the UK context, before turning in Section 5 to discuss possibilities for ways 
forward rooted in this perspective. 
 
4. The UK Context and the Cases of Northern Rock, Bradford and Bingley and HBOS 
 
Llewellyn (2009a, 2010) has argued that at the heart of the crisis in the UK was the move by 
bankers towards greater reliance upon wholesale funding, securitisation and the use of new 
financial instruments, shifting credit risk off the balance sheet. He (2010, p.8) concludes 
with the now universal phrase summarising the crisis: ‘banks stopped behaving like banks’. 
Traditional lending and monitoring practices were effectively relegated to a secondary role 
in the quest for greater market shares of (mortgage) lending. Retrospective analysis of these 
events has highlighted regulatory issues, focusing in particular on the split and execution of 
supervision responsibilities between the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Bank of 
England.
6
 However, a striking aspect often overlooked in discussions of the UK crisis 
concerns the characteristics of the banking institutions that played central roles in the 
development of the crisis.  
 
Three of the main institutions affected had either converted from mutually-owned building 
societies or were the result of mergers including former building societies.
7
 Moreover they 
were at the forefront of the extraordinary growth in the mortgage market. Following 
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demutualisation, Northern Rock began to pursue a strategy of focusing almost exclusively 
upon the mortgage market, gradually withdrawing from the provision of ‘non-core financial 
services’ such as insurance products (Stephens, 2001, pp.338-341). By 2007, it had become 
one of the top 5 mortgage lenders in the UK, with this lending largely funded from global 
wholesale markets (BBC News, 15/09/07). Mortgage lending also became riskier and less 
prudent. Bradford and Bingley relied heavily upon wholesale funding to become a specialist 
in the growing ‘buy-to-let’ market, a market with greater exposure to default given the high 
number of ‘self certified’ mortgages (where borrowers are not required to provide proof of 
income). HBOS – a merger of the former building society Halifax and the Bank of Scotland 
in 2001 – was the UK’s largest mortgage lender and actively pursued lending in specialist 
higher risk activities, such as buy-to-let and subprime mortgages. HBOS was also the most 
reliant of all UK banks upon the wholesale markets, and its lending was estimated to be 
almost twice that of its deposits (The Times, 17/09/08).  
 
Northern Rock was the first major UK casualty of the financial crisis in September 2007. 
Exposure of its weaknesses lead to a ‘run’ on the bank, the first in the UK since 1866 (Shin, 
2009). The bank sought emergency funding of around £3 billion from the Bank of England, 
and within a week of the crisis its share price had fallen by 60% (BBC News, 15/09/07). By 
January 2008 loans from the Bank of England reached £26 billion, with further guarantees of 
approximately £30 billion. During the autumn of 2007 and the early part of 2008 the 
government invited bids for Northern Rock, although given the extent of the Bank of 
England’s involvement all bids were subject to government approval. Ultimately no bid was 
deemed acceptable and, given the interests of taxpayers, depositors and wider financial 
stability, Northern Rock was taken into public ownership in February 2008.
8
 
 
Almost a year later a similar fate afflicted both Bradford and Bingley (B&B) and the much 
larger HBOS. In the case of B&B, rising concerns about exposure to the ‘buy-to-let’ market 
led to a downgrading of its’ credit rating and ability to access wholesale markets. A rights 
issue of £400 million in June 2008 failed to provide sufficient new capital, and in September 
2008 B&B was nationalised, while its savings operations were sold to the Spanish financial 
group Banco Santander. HBOS’s tale is woefully similar. Falling housing prices meant that 
asset values on its book were unlikely to meet liabilities, again leading to a downgraded 
credit rating. The bank’s heavy reliance upon wholesale funding for daily operations was 
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compromised and the subsequent collapse in its share price in September 2008 exacerbated 
the situation. A proposed takeover by rival Lloyds TSB to secure its capital base was waived 
through and allowed to bypass UK competition law. In October 2008 the government took a 
40% share in HBOS, becoming the largest single shareholder as part of the government’s 
emergency £37 billion ‘bailout’ of the UK banking sector.9  
 
These three cases raise important questions regarding the governance of key decisions. In 
particular, what drove these former building societies to pursue such risky strategies; 
strategies that they would not have been able to pursue had they remained mutual 
organisations, and which ultimately led to them being the most seriously affected UK banks 
in the crisis. Moreover, the behaviour of these institutions is particularly striking given that 
the UK mutual sector - with one or two exceptions - weathered the recent financial storm 
much better than commercial banks (Morgan and O’Hara Jakeway, 2009, p.34). Due to legal 
restrictions on accessibility to wholesale funding, reliance upon internal capital and a 
generally lower attitude to risk, the mutual sector was by and large far more prudent in its 
business decisions. As Llewellyn (2009b, 2010) notes, these firms did not move away 
significantly from the traditional banking model. As such they were generally in a better 
position to withstand the credit crisis, although they were clearly also affected by the 
contagion effects such as falling house prices and increasing personal bankruptcies. 
 
The governance questions raised by this chain of events are coherent with the strategic 
choice perspective presented in Section 3. The juxtaposition of models with very different 
decision-making bases suggests a need to focus more analysis on how processes of decision-
making are articulated within banks. The current period of reform for these former building 
societies, where government has been forced into taking significant ownership stakes, 
represents an ideal opportunity to do so. In this context the aim of the next Section is to 
explore possibilities that are rooted in fundamental concern with widening participation in 
decision-making.  
 
5. Looking to the Future  
 
Indications are that the UK government would like to seek a relatively quick privatisation of 
their stakes in the rescued financial institutions. Having previously split Northern Rock into 
 12 
a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ bank in January 2010 (The Times, 26/04/2011), they announced in June 
2011 the intention to auction off the good bank by the end of 2011 (BBC News, 15/06/2011; 
The Times, 17/06/2011), with a sale to Virgin Money announced in November 2011 (BBC 
News, 17/11/2011a).  Furthermore, the government stakes are held by UK Financial 
Investments Ltd, which has a remit “to dispose of the Government’s shareholdings in RBS 
and Lloyds in an orderly and active way” (UKFI, 2011). Desire for speedy disposal is no 
doubt influenced by political objectives, with the government eager to generate capital 
receipts, reduce the state’s direct involvement in the financial sector and possibly highlight 
its ‘success’ in ‘turning around’ the ailing banks. There are, however, strong arguments 
against a rushed sale back to the private sector. In particular, public ownership of substantial 
interests in various financial institutions represents a unique opportunity for significant 
reform of governance within the sector that could address the strategic failures that underpin 
recent crises. The early sale of Northern Rock plc therefore represents a huge wasted 
opportunity for such reform, but the government has still got significant ownership stakes in 
other financial organisations for which it isn’t yet too late.   
 
For governance reform to be meaningful it needs to move beyond current proposals by 
putting in place governance structures capable of achieving the dynamic integration of public 
interests. This requires more than the measures indicated in the Walker Review such as 
tightening regulation, ensuring competition, ring-fencing different banking functions, and 
more effective monitoring of risk taking. Specifically, reforms to the government-owned 
banks offer an opportunity to get to the root of strategic failure by creating more inclusive 
and democratic governance structures. While this will require a certain degree of 
experimentation with appropriate mechanisms to articulate different interests, failure to 
address the root cause of strategic failure risks a repetition of recent events and the 
prolongation of the status quo for a sector that is currently structured to serve the needs of 
the few but not the wider public.  
 
5.1 A return to mutuality? 
Given the policy prescriptions of the strategic choice approach and the history of both the 
UK financial sector in general and the three cases discussed in particular, an obvious starting 
point for reform discussions is to consider re-mutualisation. Indeed, mutuality is a form of 
ownership and governance that is presently topical in the UK. The Government has 
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launched, for example, a number of employee-led ‘pathfinder mutual’ pilot schemes aimed 
at furthering its ‘Big Society’ agenda of local mutually-provided public services (Cabinet 
Office, 2010). In line with this, mutual ownership is being considered in discussions around 
reform of the network of Post Offices (Co-operatives UK, 2011) and of Scottish Water 
(Scottish Futures Trust, 2010).
10
 Such a solution is also gaining interest with respect to the 
banking sector (Michie, 2010; Michie and Llewellyn, 2010; Oxford Centre for Mutual & 
Employee-owned Business, 2009), in which context Morgan and O’Hara Jakeway (2009, p. 
34) have argued that the principles of mutualism ‘could transform banks into the servants of 
their communities rather than masters of the universe’. Furthermore, ideas for mutual 
ownership appear to enjoy some sympathy at the UK Commission on Ownership, and also 
benefit from a degree of political and public support. On the government’s announcement of 
the auction of Northern Rock plc, for example, the finance spokesman of the opposition 
condemned the move and called for a mutual approach instead (BBC News, 15/06/2011), 
and there were similar calls when the sale to Virgin Money was announced (BBC News, 
17/11/2011b). A mutual solution was also supported by an opinion poll commissioned by 
the Coventry Building Society, one of two mutually owned societies reported to have been 
interested in the auction for Northern Rock plc (The Times, 26/04/2011). 
 
From a strategic choice perspective, mutuality is intuitively attractive for the banking sector 
because the collective ownership (by their customers) of building societies provides 
potential advantages for facilitating more inclusive governance. Each member is given one 
vote irrespective of the size of their custom, and can use this vote to provide corporate 
governance in a similar way to shareholders in limited companies. For instance, members 
can exercise a certain degree of ‘voice’ at annual general meetings, where the society’s 
executives appear for re-election, and the ‘exit’ option is also available by moving deposits 
elsewhere. Thus in theory mutuality confers an environment that is conducive to a wider 
dispersion of strategic decision-making among customers, who constitute a key group of 
stakeholders with an interest in the activities of the organisation. Indeed, according to 
Marshall et al. (2003, p. 735), mutuality ‘stresses mutual interdependence as the means of 
promoting collective well-being’. As members are both users and owners of the business, 
the absence of external shareholders allows surpluses to be distributed to members in the 
form of low cost mortgages and low risk savings accounts with preferential rates of interest 
(Kay, 1991; Drake and Llewellyn, 2001). More widely, many building societies have 
 14 
traditionally been involved in paternalistic activities in their own communities, often 
adopting ‘profit-satisficing’ behaviour such as maintaining (unprofitable) branch networks 
and extending basic financial services to financially excluded parties (see Marshall et al., 
2003: 743-746). While recognising that customers do not represent all potential interests in 
the activities of a given bank, it seems expedient to learn from experiences with such a 
model before also looking further afield to lessons from elsewhere. 
 
5.2 Lessons from the past and the existing Building Societies 
The fact that many financial organisations have moved away from a mutual model in recent 
years suggests that the traditional building society model has issues that need addressing. In 
this sense it is clear that it cannot be taken as a panacea for the problems of the sector. For 
instance, automatic notions of democracy and altruism within the UK building society 
movement are not realistic. Indeed, as early as in 1984 Barnes (1984) was concerned about 
the monopolistic activities of the larger building societies; in particular the cartels that 
persisted in the 1960s and 1970s which restricted competition at the expense of members’ 
welfare. He also raised concerns about the low participation rates of members in decision-
making processes – such as at annual meetings – and the (lack of) accountability of directors 
to members. These issues became more acute as membership grew and senior executives 
became more remote. Moreover, in the more liberalised era of the 1980s and 1990s, building 
societies began to adopt a more commercial approach and often operated like banks (Drake, 
1997), thus distancing themselves from the original ideals of mutuality. 
 
The intense period of demutualisation during the 1990s followed a long period in which 
financial market de-regulation had led to increased competition from banks and other 
financial institutions that had left mutuality widely regarded as being an ‘outdated’ form of 
ownership. The ability of building societies to compete in this environment was 
compromised by the size of their capital and by legislation, and led to growing frustration 
among the hierarchies in a number of high profile building societies. These senior executives 
often had little sympathy for the principles of mutuality and generally favoured more 
aggressive commercial approaches. Moreover, they were increasingly influential, 
particularly in shaping the direction of corporate strategy within the sector (Marshall et al. 
1997, 2003). Demutualisation was thus seen as an opportunity for greater freedom in the 
market and, supported by members’ growing expectation of demutualisation windfalls, a 
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number of leading building societies converted to public limited companies in the late 
1990s.
11
 For senior executives, there were also other attractions. Demutualisation offered 
legal protection from hostile takeover for 5 years following conversion, thus protecting 
incumbent positions of office. It also offered senior executives the possibility of higher 
personal financial incentives and rewards, something which was instrumental in driving the 
demutualisation process forward (see also, Barnes and Ward, 1999). These private interests 
were in some cases pursued despite resistance from others: see, for example, Perks’s (1991) 
detailed account of the measures taken by Abbey National’s corporate executives to nullify 
opposition to that society’s demutualisation process in the late 1980s.  
 
While strategic failure in the banking sector as a whole cannot be attributed to this process 
of demutualisation, the pursuit of narrow private interests that it illustrates is symptomatic of 
a more general diagnosis of the banking sector. Moreover, the recent difficulties of a number 
of current building societies can be attributed to a lack of accountability in their governance 
structures, and associated behaviour outside their traditional domains in attempts to compete 
in certain markets.
12
 The Dunfermline Building Society, for example, had to be rescued by 
the government and its rival Nationwide Building Society in March 2009. In the four years 
prior to this, the society had been warned by the FSA that it was taking risks when it moved 
into commercial property lending and self-certified mortgages (BBC News, 20/05/09).  
 
Yet would a greater degree of mutuality have provided a more stable financial environment? 
A crucial argument relates to the degree of risk undertaken within the overall market. In the 
earlier demutualisation debate, Llewellyn and Holmes (1991) argued that a wider variety of 
financial institutions provides greater stability to the overall market vis-à-vis a concentration 
of similar types of institutions. They suggested that since mutuals are not susceptible to the 
short-term demands of shareholders, they are less likely to undertake risky projects. A 
balance of ownership forms may thus play a role in limiting instability in the event of a 
banking crisis. Such arguments have seen resurgence in the light of the recent crisis. Various 
authors have suggested that a mixed governance structure for the overall financial sector, 
consisting of a variety of institutions with different capital structures and portfolios (i.e. 
‘bio-diversity’), is more likely to reduce systemic risk and provide for a more stable 
environment (Llewellyn, 2009a, 2009b, 2010; The Oxford Centre for Mutual & Employee-
owned Business, 2009; Michie, 2010; Michie and Llewellyn, 2010; Ayadi et al, 2010).  
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Such diversity is in line with the theoretical arguments that support the strategic choice 
perspective. A balance of governance solutions potentially facilitates the participation of a 
wider range of interests in the key decision-making processes that shape the behaviour and 
performance of the sector as a whole. However, as is clear from the experiences discussed 
above, building societies in the UK also have governance issues and are subject to similar 
pressures to banks in many respects. Any moves to employ a mutual solution need to be 
updated so as to avoid the problems of the past. In particular they need to integrate new 
ways of dynamically articulating the full range of different interests in decision-making 
processes. As such, lessons can also be learned from experiences in other sectors. 
 
5.3 Lessons from elsewhere 
There are countless other organisations from which useful governance lessons can be 
learned. To start, we might consider the German two-tier board structure, where the 
management board is appointed by, and takes strategic decisions in conjunction with, a 
supervisory board which is more stakeholder orientated in that it contains shareholder and 
worker representatives (see German Government Commission, 2009). The enduring success 
of this system suggests a successful governance system need not be based solely on 
shareholders, and that a system with two boards, where each has its own clearly defined 
function, can be made to work. There are also many examples of UK organisations that are 
not shareholder based, but instead integrate the interests of a variety of stakeholders. The 
following are all ‘companies limited by guarantee’, meaning that they are limited liability 
companies which are owned and governed not by shareholders, but by a relatively small 
membership who are said to be representative of their wider stakeholders: Northern Ireland 
Mutual Energy, Glas Cymru (Welsh Water), Network Rail, Nominet UK, Oxfam, the 
Wellcome Trust, the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB), and many other charities, 
social enterprises and housing associations.
13
 Similarly there are also many organisations 
which are ‘trustee companies’, where trustees ensure the organisation is run in the interests 
of the beneficiaries of the trust, which can be defined to include a range of stakeholder 
interests. Examples include the John Lewis Partnership, The National Trust, and the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 
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Whilst these organisations operate in different fields and vary considerably in size and the 
detail of their governance arrangements, they have in common that they are successfully 
functioning organisations that are governed by members or trustees (henceforth members for 
simplicity) who represent not themselves, but other interested stakeholders. Generally 
speaking they are professionally run by an executive team who are experts in the sector. 
This team is held to account by a group of members, who represent wider interests within 
the scope of the rules in place for the organisation. The exact details of the size of 
membership and the process of being a member vary, so it is clear that there isn’t a one-size-
fits-all approach. By and large these member panels vary in size between 10 and 30, to 
balance practicality, cost and effective operation with the need to have sufficient voices to 
reflect the actual diversity of opinion. Most importantly, such organisations are explicitly 
designed to make decisions informed by the ‘many’ with an interest in their activities, rather 
than by the ‘few’ with an interest in their own private return. As such they represent an 
alternative to shareholder corporate governance models that is theoretically capable of 
representing a wider range of interests, potentially easing problems of strategic failure. Their 
effectiveness, however, will critically depend on the mechanisms in place to facilitate the 
articulation of these interests. There is no sense in creating such a membership model if 
members do not have effective and efficient ways of articulating their ‘voice’ that has real 
influence on strategic decisions. 
 
To illustrate we might draw upon the experiences of the BBC, which is neither privately nor 
publically controlled in the conventional sense. It is mandated by Royal Charter to operate in 
the interests of the ‘public’ of license-fee payers that it is tasked to serve. To carry out this 
brief the Charter establishes a BBC Trust, which is required ‘actively to seek the views of, 
and engage with, licence fee payers’ (DCMS, 2006: Section 26). This operates alongside a 
series of mechanisms through which public ‘voice’ can be developed, including ‘National 
Broadcasting Councils’ for different parts of the UK, the geographical dispersion of 
production and ‘drop-in’ facilities, and considerable website space dedicated to informing on 
its activities and enabling comment and feedback (Branston and Wilson, 2006). Compared 
with the commercial rivals it competes against, the BBC is theoretically less prone to 
‘strategic failure’ given the presence of channels for the development of voice and the use of 
these by a Trust that can hold management to account. Of course, how this operates in 
practice is another question, and the BBC has been heavily criticised for various aspects of 
 18 
its operation. Nevertheless, that such mechanisms can work in enabling the interests of 
‘publics’ to influence decisions can be seen in the decision to close the digital radio station 
BBC 6 Music, which was subsequently overturned by the BBC trust following the strong 
articulation of voice by certain publics (The Guardian, 05/08/2010). 
 
Also of particular relevance to our discussion are the aforementioned reforms of the Post 
Office network and Scottish Water in officially commissioned reports. Both of these reviews 
recognise the inherent difficulties of balancing a workable system with the desire to include 
the many voices with an interest in the operations of such large companies. The simple 
mutual solution of ‘one member one vote’ is seen to be inoperable in both settings, and 
similar conclusions are reached as to an appropriate way forward if the current status quo of 
government ownership is to be rejected. Both commissions essentially identify a solution 
where management is held to account by a representative body of members representing 
public interests. This is in line with the experiences of the other organisations mentioned 
above and, we suggest, represents a route for consideration in the financial sector (see 
Scottish Futures Trust, 2010 and Co-operatives UK, 2010).  
 
Indeed, each of the organisational examples considered herein illustrates institutional 
possibilities that offer potential for the development of governance solutions that can reduce 
the dangers of strategic failure. We suggest that exploring, testing and advancing these 
possibilities as part of the required governance reforms of the banking industry is an 
important challenge for public policy.  The early sale of Northern Rock means we can only 
consider what might have been done with the governance structure of that organisation, but a 
change in the direction of current government policy could allow its ownership holdings 
elsewhere in the financial sector to be mechanisms for truly reforming policy.  
 
5.4 An Outline Policy Suggestion 
Based on our arguments above, one possibility for the banking sector is a return to some 
form of reformed mutual ownership status, but with a corresponding bolstering of 
governance mechanisms to ensure the development of voice. This would automatically give 
the right of participation to those with a significant interest, and would do so in a way that 
isn’t dependent upon a significant financial contribution. In this respect membership rights 
might be conferred for a small (nominal) deposit (e.g. £1), as in the remaining building 
 19 
societies, so that they would be open to all. One difference to existing practice would need 
to be the inclusion of employees; a group with a very significant interest in the organisation, 
but excluded from the existing building society mutual model.   
 
However mutual status by itself does not necessarily provide for an inclusive and democratic 
environment (Barnes, 1984). There is the danger of ‘elite capture’, with agendas and 
strategies being pursued in narrow interests. To guard against this, measures would need to 
be put in place, perhaps in the Articles of Association, to safeguard the democratic rights of 
all members and encourage wider participation. The real challenge would be to develop 
mechanisms and processes of engagement among members that are capable of balancing 
different interests in the process of strategic decision-making. In this regard lessons can be 
learned from the member controlled organisations cited in the previous section. Furthermore, 
articulating the advantages of voice processes will be critical to prevent against the 
possibility of a second de-mutualisation (an exit from mutuality). Of course, any new mutual 
society will continue to face competitive pressures to act commercially. Indeed, as we have 
noted, many remaining building societies now operate in similar ways to banks. However, if 
structures, regulations and Articles of Association are designed carefully then there is no 
reason why mutuals cannot co-exist with more commercial organisations as they have done 
for over 150 years previously, and be able to pursue interests that are wider than profit.
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One possibility for achieving these goals is the creation of a panel of members with a role to 
actively seek and represent the views of the whole body of members, acting in a supervisory 
capacity. A significant problem of a standard mutually-owned building society is that 
members are numerous and individually small, meaning that in reality there is little member 
power as it is hard to form a coalition for change (Barnes, 1984). By creating a members’ 
body that sits between management and all members, this problem would be directly 
addressed. Clearly careful planning would be needed to ensure that it did represent members’ 
views, but with some trial and adjustments real benefits are possible. For example, seats 
could be reserved for borrower members, saver members, and employees so that no one set 
of interests is unduly dominant, and the panel could be established with a specific statutory 
duty of consulting all members on appropriate policy, and reporting back to them on key 
decisions taken. The exact size and make-up of this panel would need to be appropriate for 
the organisation in question, balancing the interests of different types of members with the 
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size and nature of the firm, and also balancing the need for wide participation with limits on 
numbers to enable a practical operational design. Similarly the remit for this panel would 
need to be carefully defined so that they could hold the management team to account and 
appropriately be involved with strategic decision-making, but not in a way that requires too 
much specialised knowledge which would act to prohibit involvement. In this regard there 
might be a role for specialised members who are independent of the organisation but who 
have the appropriate level of knowledge to inform the work of the member’s panel. 
 
Whilst such ideas are a departure from the existing building society model, they are not so 
radical to be dismissed as unworkable; as we have seen, much of what we advocate exists in 
governance settings elsewhere. The likely main political obstacle is that the mere transfer of 
the state’s ownership stakes to the (new) society’s members will not raise monies to 
recompense the tax-payer. Given the current level of UK government borrowing, this is a 
considerable barrier. However, applying a re-mutualisation process to the nationalised banks 
would remove the banks from the state’s books and thus (in time) ease the pressure on the 
public finances. Furthermore, with some creative thinking and a long term view, mutuality is 
a feasible and credible option. As noted above, there is much to be said for re-balancing the 
financial system between mutual and commercial banking institutions. Not only does such a 
move promote greater competition, but it also widens diversity in terms of capital structures 
and loan portfolios, thus reducing systemic risk within the system and lessening the 
possibility of future crises. A more stable and sustainable financial system is likely to 
provide real long term value to the taxpayer, and this might well outweigh the short-term 
benefits of immediate capital-receipts (Michie and Llewellyn, 2010).   
 
Two specific possibilities present themselves. The first is for the government to create 
mutual ownership organisations from its stakes in former building societies, and fund this 
through the profitable commercial sale of its stakes in other banks. This is clearly a second 
best solution in that it only partially reforms the government-owned institutions. However, it 
could be seen as part of a longer, on-going project to establish new governance mechanisms 
in financial institutions, and test their benefits. The second possibility is that the government 
creates mutual ownership structures (and encourages associated development of new 
governance mechanisms) through the loan of the required capital to these new mutual 
organisations. This money is then repaid over time through a proportion of profits. This 
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would place a ‘profit-satisficing’ condition on future operations at least until the government 
investment had been repaid. This second possibility would not raise monies in the short 
term, but has the advantage of being applicable to all of the financial stakes that the 
government owns at present. A mixed alternative would ensure that some money is raised 
initially by the sale of some bank shares, whilst the former building society elements are re-
mutualised with the investment capital being repaid slowly over time. 
 
If such a member-centric organisation could be created using the government ownership 
holdings, there is no reason that this model, once established, could not be extended to other 
building societies. The government could provide backing for this scheme in terms of 
processes and governance models, and since these are already mutually-owned such changes 
should not draw heavily upon resources. Indeed, by kick-starting such a reform of the wider 
sector we might envisage a further level of reform where each institution specialises in a 
certain area. This might be a geographic area, providing financial services of the type 
required by particular locations or regions, or it could be specialising in the needs of specific 
industries. This has the advantage of focusing members’ interests and easing processes of 
participation and consensus-building in decision-making. Other possibilities for 
specialisation might include ethical banking or services acceptable to various religious faiths.  
Indeed, were such target institutions to be created, perhaps specialist ‘industry’ members 
might also be included in the governance mechanisms.
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6. Concluding Comments   
 
The strategic choice approach provides unique insights into the recent financial crisis and a 
focus that is markedly different from typical mainstream approaches, which have tended to 
analyse regulatory and market failures. While these issues are important, there is a danger of 
too narrow a focus that neglects deeper issues at the root of the crisis. In contrast, the 
strategic choice approach calls for a particular emphasis upon processes of governance 
within the banking sector so as to facilitate the attainment of public interest objectives. The 
argument pursued in this paper is that the restricted strategic decision-making processes of 
the banks and other financial institutions prevented the identification of a strategy that was 
in the wider public interest; the chosen strategy corresponded to the interests of ‘the few’ in 
control of these institutions. This was dominated by a desire for short term returns, 
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necessitating disproportionate risks. The UK’s former building societies are demonstrative 
of this scenario; our analysis has linked their current plight, and the associated ‘strategic 
failure’ in the financial sector, with previous strategic decisions concerning their ownership 
and governance structures.   
 
Our focus on governance has pointed towards a re-examination of the issue of mutual 
ownership, given that different ownership settings provide different opportunities for 
governance processes. However we have suggested that this model needs to be reformulated 
so that all of those with a significant interest are included as members, and to ensure that 
these members have real power to articulate their interests in the governance process. To 
that end we have advocated exploring the possibility of creating membership panels with a 
clearly defined remit to sit between the body of members and management.  
 
In advocating such policies we are in essence calling for measures that will facilitate the 
democratisation of the key decision-making processes of the various institutions that 
comprise the financial sector. The former building societies specifically discussed are just a 
starting point given the opportunity that the current government ownership of these 
institutions presents. In the longer term policies are required to ensure that the management 
of the whole financial sector is geared more towards the public interest than the attainment 
of short-run profits. Such policies need to nurture the public’s articulation of ‘voice’ so that 
they no longer have to rely upon exit strategies when dealing in this market. The reform of 
state-owned financial organisations is therefore just a first, but important, step if the banking 
sector is to be transformed to better reflect the long-term public interest.  
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1
 A ‘building society’ is a mutually owned bank which specialises in mortgages and saving products. These 
institutions are very similar to the ‘savings and loan associations’ of the USA. 
2
 The Commission on Ownership was set-up in the UK following the financial crisis in order to establish "a 
new and clear understanding of the influence that ownership has on the governance of our country, on British 
businesses and in the public sector". See http://ownershipcomm.org/ for more information. 
3
 Long draws in particular on the seminal work of Dewey (1927) in analysing the public interest: for a more 
detailed analysis, see Sacchetti and Sugden (2007). 
4
 The baby analogy is useful for a further point regarding regulation. Sometimes the public is ‘wrong’ and 
regulation is needed to limit what they would otherwise like to happen. It isn’t always appropriate for a child to 
stay up late and eat chocolate. The key difference in this situation is that utilising regulation alone removes (or 
at the very least reduces) the possibility of the public themselves from identifying superior solutions or 
outcomes. The public in this setting has no possibility of using Hirschman’s (1970) concept of voice. 
5
 The Walker Review was commissioned in February 2009 by the then UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and 
was chaired by David Walker of the Audit Commission. The review made 38 recommendations in relation to 
reforming corporate governance within the UK banking and finance sector. Further details are available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gove.uk/walker_review_information.htm. 
6The FSA’s creation in 1997 was part of a new financial framework where the (independent) operation of 
monetary policy was assigned to the Bank of England, which in turn relinquished responsibilities for financial 
supervision to a new body (the FSA) to avoid any ‘conflict of interest’ (see Di Noia and Di Giorgio, 1999).  
7
 It is also noteworthy that in addition to these three cases not one of the other demutualised building societies 
has survived as an independent financial institution, the others being subsequently taken over by rival banking 
groups (Michie and Llewellyn, 2010). 
8
 See Shin (2009) for a more in-depth overview and analysis of the collapse of Northern Rock. 
9
 To comply with EU state aid rules, the enlarged Lloyds Banking group was required to divest a significant 
package of branches, brands and customer accounts.  It was announced in December 2011 that the mutually 
owned Co-operative Banking Group was the preferred buyer of these assets which seems prescient given the 
arguments for mutuality contained later herein. See BBC News (14/12/2011) for more details on the sale. 
10
 In the latter case it is suggested that this option is unlikely to work given the large scale of the utility 
business. However another option being considered is a ‘Public Benefit Corporation’, which would own the 
organisation ‘for the people’ in a similar way to the ‘company limited by guarantee membership’ model that we 
mention in section 5.3 below. 
11
 The demutualisation process was exacerbated by the entrance of ‘carpet baggers’, who became members in 
anticipation of participating in the expected ‘windfalls’. In essence, demutualisation engineered an inter-
generational redistribution of reserves, as current members appropriated value built up by previous generations 
of members (Llewellyn, 2009b).   
12
 Building societies were not immune to the crisis. However, their problems largely emerged due to the 
subsequent downturn in the property market (which resulted from the crisis) rather than any over-reliance upon 
wholesale funding (Llewellyn, 2009b).  
13
 See overview in Scottish Futures Trust (2010). 
14
 In order to ensure stability and safeguard against further de-mutualisation (which current legislation would 
allow), some form of ‘asset lock’ preventing members from realising the mutual’s underlying assets might be 
put in place. This could be achieved by legislation, but in the short term charitable assignment practices that 
have been a successful defence (against demutualisation) in existing building societies may suffice (Michie and 
Llewellyn, 2010).   
15
 Whilst our analysis has been applied to building societies, it should be noted that much of the content could 
also be applied to credit unions. Credit unions are relatively small, mutually-owned financial service 
institutions where membership is restricted to those with a ‘common bond’ (such as common geographic 
location or place of work). They account for a very small share of the UK financial market, but are seen to have 
a big role in combating social exclusion. For more on the functioning of credit unions in general, see Ryder and 
Baker (2003), Ward and McKillop (2005), McKillop et al (2007), and Chambers and Ryder (2008).  For 
evidence of similar problems with their governance that we have highlighted for building societies herein, see 
Davis (2001), Leggett and Strand (2002), and  Bauer, Miles and Nishikawa (2009).  
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